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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KARL L. BADGER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
PAUL TAYLOR CLAYSON, 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case 
No.10517 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
rrhis is an action to recover damages for personal 
injury and property damage resulting from an auto-
mobile accident at an intersection controlled by a sema-
phore signal. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the trial the jury found plaintiff negligent m 
failing to maintain a proper lookout and returned a ver-
dict in favor of defendant and against plaintiff of ''No 
ca use of action." Judgment in accordance with the 
jury verdict was entered by the Court. Thereafter, plain-




Respondent seeks to have the action of the lower 
court affirmed in entering judgment of no cause of action 
upon the jury verdict and in denying plaintiff's ::\Iotion 
for a New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 30th day of December, 1963, at approximately 
8 :00 o'clock A.M., plaintiff, Karl L. Badger, \\ras driving 
an automobile east on 4500 South Street and defendant, 
Paul Taylor Clayson, was driving an automobile south 
on 1300 East Street in Salt Lake County. 
Forty-five hundred South Street runs east and west 
and 1300 East Street runs north and south. The inter-
section of the two streets is controlled by a traffic sema-
phore. (B,77, TS.) Thirteenth East has a paved sur-
face width of 35 feet while 4500 South has a paved sur-
face width of 32 feet. Both streets have shoulders 10 
feet wide. (R76, (TS, R93, T25.) 
West of the intersection 4500 South is level while 
north of the intersection 1300 East drops off quite rap-
idly (R77, T9). On the northwest or common corner of 
the intersection there were two power poles and a house 
and some low, defoliated bushes (R98, T30). 
At the trial defendant testified that he was going 
south on 1300 East at about 30 m.p.h. (R242, T174). 
Just as he entered the intersection the traffic sema-
phore changed from green to yellow for him (R243, 
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Tl 75). He also stated that he was "right on" plaintiff's 
car when he first saw it (R240, Tl72). 
Plaintiff testified that he was traveling east on 4500 
South Street and that as he approached the intersection 
he cannot recall seeing any cars at the intersection, even 
thong;h there was nothing to obstrnct his view other than 
what the photographs show (R214, 225, T146, 147). He 
further stated that he did not see defendant's vehicle 
until almost the point of impact (R218, T150), but he 
could have seen it as he entered the intersection had he 
been looking (R214, 225, T146, 147). Plaintiff has no 
explanation as to why he did not see defendant's car until 
he did (R219, T151). 
Both parties testified that they did not apply their 
brakes prior to the collision, and their testimony was 
borne out by the investigating officer who stated that 
there were no skid marks from either vehicle prior to 
the point of impact. The accident took place in the south-
west quadrant of the intersection, the point of impact 
being 23 feet 4 inches from the north edge of the inter-
section and 11 feet 3 inches from the west edge of the 
intersection and involved the right rear side of defend-
ant's car and the front of plaintiff's car (R89, T21). 
Upon the conclusion of the evidence the Court sub-
mitted the question of defendant's negligence and plain-
tiffs contributory negligence to the jury upon a special 
verdict (R52). The jury was asked to find on "Ques-
tion No. 1 : What negligent acts proximately caused the 
collision?'' In response to this question the jury was 
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asked to indicate what, if any, negligent acts were com. 
mitted by either party. The jury made answer as follows: 
"(A) Answer as to Mr. Clayton's negligence, if 
any: We feel that the preponderance of 
evidence shows that Mr. Clayson was in the 
intersection when the light was red. 
(B) Answer as to Mr. Badger's negligence, if 
any: We feel Mr. Badger was negligent in 
failing to observe proper lookout on an 
accepted hazardous corner.'' ( R52). 
Judgment of "No Cause of Action'' upon the jury 
verdict was entered by the Court on November 12, 1965 
(R53). Thereafter, plaintiff made a motion for a new 
trial on the grounds that (1) The verdict of the jury is 
contrary to the evidence and contrary to law, and (2) 
Error in law in the Court's instructions to the jury 
(R54). The motion was argued on November 24, 1965 
and on December 1, 1965, the trial court entered its order 
denying plaintiff's motion (R56). This appeal was then 
initiated by plaintiff. 
In page 7 of its Brief, plaintiff asserts categorically 
that the jury unanimously found defendant had "run the 
red light.'' Defendant respectfully calls this Court's at-
tention to the fact that that was not the jury's :finding in 
respect to the negligence of Mr. Clayson. What the jury 
did find was only that defendant ''was in the intersection 
when the light was red'' which is a far different thing 
than running a red light. Implicit in this finding is the 
fact that plaintiff "jumped the gun" and entered the 
intersection before the light turned green for him. The 
jury also found more than that plaintiff was guilty of 
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failing to maintain a proper lookout, but found him neg-
ligent in failing to' maintain a proper lookout at an 




reHE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN 
THE LOWER COURT ARE PRESUMED BY 
THE REVIEWING COURT ON APPEAL TO 
BE CORRECT. 
The cases are legion supporting the general propo-
sition of law stated in Point I, and especially as it applies 
to the instant case. No ooses have been found by re-
spondent stating a contrary position. 
Not only is there a presumption of validity on appeal 
of the judgment and proceedings in the lower court, but 
the burden is on the appellant affirmatively to demon-
strate error, and in the absence of such the judgment 
must be affirmed by the reviewing court. Leithead v. 
Adair, 10 U. 2d 282, 351 P. 2d 956; Coombs v. Perry, 2 U. 
2d 381, 275 P. 2d 680. Again, on appeal the judgment 
of the trial court is presumptively correct and every rea-
sonable intendment must be indulged in by the appellate 
court in favor of it. Burton v. Zions Co-operative Mer-
cantile Institution, 122 U. 360, 249 P. 2d 514; Nagle v. 
Club Fontainbleu, 17 U. 2d 125, 405 P. 2d 346; Petty r. 
Gindy Ma;nufacturing Corporation, 17 U. 2d 32, 404 P. 
2d 30. 
This proposition of law is correct and is binding 
upon the appellate court whether the proceedings in the 
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lower court are before a judge only or a judge and jury. 
And the rule seems to have even more weight in the 
latter instance. When the trial court has given its ap-
proval to the determination by the jury by refusing to 
grant a new trial to the losing party, the appellate court 
will look upon the judgment of the trial court with some 
degree of verity with a presumption in favor of its valid-
ity, and again the burden is upon the appellant to show 
some persuasive reason for upsetting it. Gordon v. 
Provo City, 15 U. 2d 287, 391 P. 2d 430. In the same 
vein, it has been held that where a jury trial has been 
had and a motion for a new trial denied to the losing 
party, the presumptions are in favor of the judgment 
entered and the Supeme Court will not disturb that judg-
ment unless the appellant meets the burden of showing 
error and prejudice which deprived it of a fair trial. 
Lemmon v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Com-
pany, 9 U. 2d 195, 341 P. 2d 215. 
Other cases supporting this proposition are Charlton 
v. Hackett, 11 U. 2d 389, 360 P. 2d 176; Universal In-
vestment Company v. Carpets, Inc., 16 U. 2d 336, 400 
P. 2d 564; Taylor v. Johnson, 15 U. 2d 342, 398 P. 2d 382; 
Wendelboe v. Jacobson, 10 U. 2d 344, 353 P. 2d 178; 
Hadley v. Wood, 9 U. 2d 366, 345 P. 2d 197; Daisy Dis-
tributors, Inc., v. Local Union 976, Joint Council 67, 
Western Conference of Teamsters, 8 U. 2d 124, 329 
P. 2d 414. 
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POINT II 
THE THIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 17. 
In preparing the jury for its deliberations in this 
case the trial court gave 20 instructions which advised 
the jurors of their duties and responsibilities and the 
law (R33-51). Plaintiff's argument claiming prejudi-
cial error in the giving of Instruction 17 is, in the opin-
ion of defendant, much ado about nothing. 
Instruction No. 5 (R36) advised the jury that "vVhere 
there is a conflict in the evidence, you should reconcile 
such conflict as far as you reasonably can; but where the 
conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges, 
and mnst determine what the facts are ... " Defendant 
asserts that any conflict in the evidence and testimony as 
to the color of the light at the time of the collision, the 
ability of either driver to see the other as he entered the 
intersection, whether either driver was watching for traf-
fic as h0 entered the intersection, whethPr he should have 
been watching, and if he was, whether his lookout was 
reasonable and proper, were questions to be resolved by 
the jury. These questions were solved and on the reso-
lution thereof plaintiff was found wanting in the reason-
ableness of his lookout for other vehicles that were on or 
might have been on the roadway. 
In Instruction No. 9 (R38) the jury was told: 
If in these instructions any rule, direction, or 
idea be stated in varying ways, no emphasis there-
on is intended by me, and none should be inf erred 
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by you. For that reason, you are not to single out 
any certain sentence or any individual point or in-
struction and ignore the others, but you are to con-
sider all the instructions as a whole and are to re-
gard each in the light of all others. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The order in which the instrudions are given 
has no significance as to their relative importance. 
Instruction No. 11 (R-39-40) notes, among others, 
the following definitions for the jury: 
The order in which the instructions are given has 
no significance as to their relative importance. 
The term "negligently" means as a result of 
neg-ligence, and the term "negligence" means the 
failure to do what a reasonably y>rudent person 
would have done under the circumstances of the 
situation or the doing of what such a reasonably 
prudent person under such existing circumstances 
would have done. The essence of the fault may he 
in acting or in omitting to act. The duty is dic-
tated and measured by the exigencies of the occa-
sion (R39). 
"Reasonable care," "due care," and "ordinary 
care" mean that deg-ree of care which the rea-
sonable, prudent person would use and exercise in 
regard to his own safety under like or similar cir-
cumsbmces. (R40) 
The pertinent provisions of Instruction No. 12 are 
as follows: 
It is the duty of the driver of an automobile to 
use reasonable care under the circumstances in 
driving his car to avoid danger to himRelf and 
others. and to obserYe and be aware of the condi-
8 
tion of the highway, the traffic thereon, and other 
existing conditions; in that regard, he was obliged 
to observe due care in respect to: 
To use reasonable care to keep a lookout for other 
vehicles, or other conditions reasonably to be an-
ticipated 
Instruction No. 17 as given by the Court is as 
follows: 
You are instructed that even thoug-h the op-
rrator of an automobile has the right-of-way, he 
still has the duty to keep and to maintain a rea-
sonable, proper, and adequate lookout and to use 
reasonable and ordinary rare to avoid a collision. 
One who has the right-of-way must use due care 
while crossing and must continue to keep a rea-
sonable lookout and reappraise the situation as he 
approaches an intersection and use reasonable 
and ordinary care under the circumstances to 
avoid a collision as he proceeds. 
There is imposed upon a driver the duty to be 
aware of the relative positions and speeds of 
vehicles approaching and he mm;t recurrently re-
o bserve and reappraise in the lig-ht of the con-
sistent changing ronditiomi of a fluid traffic sit-
uation. Therefore, even if you should find from 
the evid<'IH'e in this cmie that either driver had the 
technical right-of-way, you should also consider 
that such right-of-way is a relative right only, and 
if he was careless in failing to keep and continue 
to keep a reasonable and adequate lookout or 
failed to exercise reasonahle and ordinary care 
under the circumstances t0 avoid a collision and 
that such negligence, if any, proximately con-
tributed in any substantial de.gree to cause the 
collision, he would be negligent. 
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Appellant's brief on this point does not fairly con-
sider this instruction either as to its full and true mean-
ing or in context with the other instructions. "\Vhen the 
instruction is read and considered in the light of the 
other instructions given by the Court there is not even 
the remotest indication thereon that an absolute duty to 
be aware of other vehicles on the roadway is imposed. 
The instruction did impose upon both parties the duty to 
be as alert and aware of other vehicles on the roadway 
as a reasonable, prudent person would have been under 
the same or similar circumstances. This seems to be a 
reasonable requirement in view of plaintiff's O\vn testi-
mony to the effect that he did not see defendant's vehicle 
until almost the point of impact (R218, ri1150) but that 
he could have seen it as he entered the intersection harl 
he been looking (R214, 225, T146, 147) and that he conld 
not explain why he did not see defendant's car until he 
did (R219, T151). Defendant submits that there was notb-
ing prejudicial or erroneous about Instruction 17 under 
these circumstances. 
The general rule of law is overwhelmingly that in 
actions arising out of intersection accidents or collisions 
between vehicles, the question of the contributory negli-
gence, especially as it relates to lookout, of either or both 
of the drivers involved in the accident is a jury question. 
See Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Prar-
tice, Permarnent Edition, Vol. 10 B, Sec. 6619, and the 
multitude of cases cited therein. 
This rule applies whether the other vehicle is ap-
proaching from the right or from the left or whether the 
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vehicles are approaching each other from opposite direc-
tio11s or at right angles. In Gold v. Portland Litmber Cor-
poration, 137 Me. 143, 16 A2d 111, a jury question of con-
tributory negligence was presented where the driver of 
plaintiff's truck, upon reaching an obstructed highway 
intersection observed no approaching traffic and pro-
ceeded into the intersection when he observed defend-
ant's truck which was approaching from the right at 
about 30 miles per hour. 
Covington v. Carpenter, 4 U. 2d 378, 294 P. 2d 788, 
was a motorcyclist's action for personal injuries suffered 
in a collision with an automobile. The trial court di-
rected a verdict inf av or of defendant. Plaintiff appealed. 
In disposing of the case the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
''Modern traffic complexities make it impossible 
to lay down hy judicial rule what will always be, 
or fail to he, reasonable care in the operation of 
motor vehicles .... 
As to what constitutes a proper lookout is usually, 
therefore, a latter-day classic question for jury 
determination, and each trial and appellate court 
must determine the rmestion as a matter of ]aw 
onlv when convinced that reasonable persons 
c01{ld not disagree upon the question when con-
scientiously applying fact to law." 
In support of this rule are Poulsen v. Manness, Utah, 
241 P. 2d 152; Hess v. Robinson, 109 U. 60, 163 P. 2d 510. 
Before the issue of contributory negligence as it 
relates to lookout may be taken from the jury the party 
seeking to have this done must show that reasonable 
minds could not differ on the question. Martin v. Stevens, 
11 
Utah, 243 P. 2d 747, 749. See also Rowe v. Dickerson, 226 
Ark. 780, 295 S.W. 2d 305; Hickenbottom v. Jeppesen, 
144 Cal. App. 2d 115; Matthews v. Nelson, 57 N.J. Super 
515, 155 A. 2d 111; Topelski v. Universal South Side 
Autos, Inc., 407 Pa. 339, 180 A. 2d 414; Rigot v. Conda, 
134 Colo. 375, 304 P. 2d 629. 
Jablenske v. Eckstrom, 247 Minn. 140, 76 N.W. 2d 
654, was an action arising out of an intersectional col-
lision between plaintiff's southbound truck and defend-
ant's westbound bus, wherein there was evidence that 
plaintiff reduced his speed and maintained a lookout to 
the east but was prevented from seeing the bus by thr 
bright sun shining from the east; plaintiff's contributory 
negligence was for the jury. 
Also supporting this position are Schmittzche v. City 
of Cape Girardeau, Mo., 327 S.vV. 2d 918; Stathopoulos 
v. Shook, 251 N.C. 33, 110 S.E. 2d 452; Moffat v. Helmer, 
345 Mich. 153, 75 N.W. 2d 887. 
The duty of all drivers to maintain a reasonable and 
proper lookout for other vehicular traffic, pedestrian traf-
fic and other hazards known or reasonably to to be an-
ticipated is so well established that defendant docs not 
feel it necessary to cite any authority in support of that 
rule. In fact, the duty to keep a proper lookout applies 
as well to the favored driver on an arterial highway as to 
a disfavored on an intersecting street, and neither driver 
can excuse his own failure to observe because the other 
failed in his duty. Conklin v. Walsh, 113 U. 276, 193 
P. 2d 437; Jol111so11 v. Syme, Ad:r., 6 U. 2d 319, 3]3 P. 
2d 468. 
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In ooncluding the discussion under this point it 
should be noted that Instruction 17 as given by the Court 
(1) was to be considered by the jury in light of all the 
other instructions, (2) was given to the jury to apply to 
the conduct of both of the parties and not just plaintiff 
as he seems to indicate in his brief, (3) did not impose 
an absolute duty of lookout upon the plaintiff or the 
defendant, ( 4) imposed a duty to maintain a reasonable 
and proper lookout on both plaintiff and defendant, (5) 
taken in consideration with all the instructions, made 
the question of the defendant's negligence and plaintiff's 
contributory negligence questions for the jury's deter-
mination. 
Def end ant respectfully asserts that the trial court's 
conduct in this regard was proper and was not in any 
way erroneous or prejudicial, and in fact, a failure to so 
instruct would have been error. 
POINT III 
THE JURY FINDING ON PROXIMATE 
CA USE IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE EVI-
DENCE AND NOT CONTRARY TO THE LAW 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
CASE, AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
For the sake of brevity, defendant incorporates by 
reference into this Point the applicable facts, law, and 
argument from Point II of this brief. 
As has been indicated, the jury found Mr. Badger 
guilty of negligence in failing to keep and maintain a 
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proper lookout while approaching ancl entering a known 
hazardous intersection. This finding was not precipi-
tously made by the jury, but only after two days of trial 
wherein it heard testimony from the parties, the investi-
gating police officer, all known witnesses to the accident. 
saw photographs of the intersection, heR rd instructions 
from the Court on the applicable law and six hours of 
deliberation. 
Eight photographs of the intersection and the ap-
proaches to it were offered and admitted into e\'idemr. 
Of these the plaintiff offered seven, Plaintiff's Exhihit 
P3 - PS, PlO, and defendant one, Defentlant 's Exhibit D9. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6 is taken on 4500 South looking 
east, approaching the intersection, and shows what plnin-
tiff could have seen us he approached it in his automobile. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 is taken on 13th East looking 
south and shows the corner of the intersection common to 
both driwrs. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10 is a panoramir 
view of the intersection. 
Plaintiff contends that the jur>' could not lrnve found 
that plaintiff was not maintaining a proper lookout or 
that if he were that it was a proximate cause of the acei-
clent. Defernlant disagrees arnl asserts that pftrr n con-
sideration of all the evidence reasonable minds most Cl'l'-
tainly could differ on a finding of plaintiff's negligence. 
Defendant's contention in this regard is amply demon-
strated by the answers of the jurors upon being polled hy 
the Court. Each juror was asked individually whether or 
not he concurred in the finding that Mr. Badger ',ms 
negligent in failing to maintain a proper lookout. rt'l1r 
14 
jurors, presumably reasonable men with reasonable 
minds, disagreed, for six of them indicated that as their 
finding, while two of them declared it was not theirs. 
The fact that reasonable minds could differ on this 
question and, in fact, did differ supports defendant's and 
thr trial judge's position that the question of plaintiff's 
neg-ligence and whether or not it was a proximate cause 
of the accident was a jury question. 
Plaintiff also attempts to take advantage of the prop-
osition of law which states that one exercising due care 
for his own safety and the safety of others need not 
anticipate negligent conduct on the part of others. How-
ever, since plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care 
at the time of the accident, since he was not maintain-
ing a proper lookout, he cannot take advantage of that 
rule. 
There is no evidence that had plaintiff been watching 
he still could not haYe avoided the accident, or that had 
he applied his brakes at the first instance when he could 
have seen defendant he could not have avoided the acci-
dent. In fact, had plaintiff decreased his speed only 
enough to allow defendant to travel six feet further de-
fendant would have cleared plaintiff's path and there 
would not have been a collision. 
Defendant feels that implicit in the requirement of a 
proper lookout is the requirement of altering one's con-
cl uct in relation to speed, control, right of way, etc., to 
conform to the demands of reasonable conduct as that 
is gauged by the situation revealed by the proper lookout. 
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Hence under all the facts and circumstances of this case 
taken as a composite, the jury found plaintiff guilty of 
negligence whieh proximately contributed to the acci-
dent and its resulting injury and damage. It cannot he 
seriously questioned that the submission of the question 
of Mr. Badger's negligence to the jury and its answer 
to that question were both correct. 
In this case it is obvious that plaintiff either looked 
and failed to see the obvious or failed to look at all, and 
in either case he would be negligent, or at least reasonable 
minds could so find. For cases discussing the question of 
lookout and the facts surrounding accidents as they relate 
to the lookout see Johnson v. Syme, Adx, 6 U. 2d 319, 
313 P. 2d 468, Sant v. Miller, 115 U. 559, 206 P. 2d 719; 
Cederloff v. Whited, 110 U. 45, 169 P. 2d 777; Ming11s v. 
Olsson, 114 U. 505, 201 P. 2d 495; Cox v. Thompson, Utah, 
254 P. 2d 1047; Wilkinson v. Oregon Short L. R. Co., 35 
U. 110, 99 P. 466; Covington v. Carpenter, 4 U. 2d 378, 
294 P. 2d 788. 
It is thus submitted that upon the bases of all the 
facts in this matter that the jury finding in relation to 
plnintiff's negligence and of its hcing a proximate cause 
of the accident was not contrary to law and, further, that 
the trial court did not err in refusing to grant plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial. 
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POINT IV 
THE VERDICT IS NOT FATALLY INCON-
SISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY. 
For the sake of brevity, defendant incorporates by 
reference the applicable law and facts from Point II and 
Point III into this Point. 
Not by any stretch of the facts, the law or the imagi-
nation can the jury's verdict be called inconsistent or 
contradictory - let alone fatally so. By means of the in-
terrogatories of the Special Verdict (R52) the jury was 
asked to state what, if any, negligent acts of either or 
ho th parties proximately (emphasis added) caused the 
collision; it was not asked to list all negligent acls of 
either party whether proximate or not. The finding of 
the jury certainly does not intimate that the duty of 
lookout was not the same for both drivers, it merely 
means that having the same duty, one driver failed in 
his duty and that failure proximately contributed to the 
co1lision. The other driver may or may not have failed in 
his duty; however, if he did fail, the jury apparently 
did not think it was a proximate cause of the aceident, 
and the finding made by the jury of negligence on the 
part of defendant was sufficient and made any additional 
findings of negligence unnecessary and superfluous. 
Having heard the testimony of all witnesses, seen 
the exhibits introduced in evidence, heard the trial 
court's instructions and argument of counsel, the jurors 
were well aware of the facts of the accident and the 
theory of negligence and non-negligence of the parties. 
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They were certainly aware of the fact that a finding of 
one act of negligence by either party would be a sufficient 
basis for awarding a verdict against defendant or deny-
ing one to plaintiff. And it may well be that the jury was 
concerned about ascertaining a primary negligent proxi-
mate cause of the accident, if any, of either or both of 
the parties rather than making a schedule of negligent 
acts that proximately contributed to the collision. Having 
determined the primary proximate causes of the accident, 
viz., being in the intersection when the light was red on 
the part of defendant and failing to maintain a proper 
lookout by plaintiff, the jury listed those causes as the 
primary proximate causes of the accident and dispensed 




It is abundantly clear that the question of the neg-
ligence of both parties was for the jury's determination, 
since reasonable minds could differ as to whether neither 
driver was negligent and, if so, whether that negligence 
proximately caused or contributed to the collision. Hav-
ing properly submitted these questions to the jury, the 
trial court refused to grant plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial after the jury found plaintiff guilty of a negligent 
act that proximately caused the collision. The evidence 
from the record justifies the action taken by the Court 
and the jury. 
Based on the foregoing facts, authorities and argu-
ment, defendant urges this Court to affirm the judgment 
of the trial court upon the jury verdict and it.s order deny-
ing plaintiff a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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